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Abstract  
This project aims to investigate the application of the Originalist theory of 
Constitutional interpretation on Supreme Court cases involving the First Amendment as 
it relates to the press and media; and if the Originalist theory upholds the 
responsibilities of the press and media. The Social Responsibility Model is the main 
media responsibility model used in this analysis. Beginning with Near v. Minnesota, a 
1931 case, and ending with Packingham v. North Carolina from 2017, media cases were 
analyzed through the lens of Inclusive Originalism. 30 cases were considered, 18 were 
read and 11 were included in the analysis. To discern whether the Originalist theory was 
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Introduction 
The Constitution, our nation’s binding contract, does not come with a play book 
or an instruction sheet; it’s standards of interpretation do not speak for itself. So how do 
American leaders know how to play by the rules? How can this document continue to 
remain relevant in our modern, media driven age? The Framers of the Constitution 
carved out a role for the courts in Article III, and strategically made the role malleable so 
it would stand the test of time. Article III establishes the Supreme Court as an entity 
separate from the President and Congress to diminish potential political influence, “The 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 
(“Constitution of the United States,” Art. III, Sec. 1.) The Justices’ independent power is 
furthered by the precedent set in the 1803 Marbury v. Madison decision delivered by 
Chief Justice Marshall, stating, “it is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to 
say what the law is,” (Supreme Court of the US 1803.) The establishment of judicial 
review empowers the courts to check Congress and strike down unconstitutional acts. 
Given this immense power over Constitutional interpretation, the theories used to guide 
judges are critically important. 
There are various theories of Constitutional interpretation, ranging from a strict 
adherence to the document’s text, to a consideration of modern societal needs. A highly 
contested and surprisingly dynamic theory of constitutional interpretation, Originalism, 
has the potential to impact modern American life, specifically our media and technology 
landscape. Originalism’s main focus is to strictly prioritize the original meaning of the 
Constitution in its original context, hence its apt name. Applying the principles of an 
18th century document in a 21st century context presents some challenges for judges and 
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justices. James Madison and Thomas Jefferson could not have possibly fathomed 
media’s evolution into Facebook or violent video games when they wrote the 
Constitution, but yet their principles still guide our modern legal relationship with this 
type of media.  
This thesis sets out to investigate the application of the Originalist theory of 
Constitutional interpretation on Supreme Court cases involving the press and media; 
and if this theory protects and serves modern day responsibilities of press and media. 
The Social Responsibility Model was chosen as a press responsibility touch stone 
because the model is a reflection of the desires of the Constitution. The model maintains 
that the freedom of the press is given by the people and for the people, not the 
government. The importance and power of the press was recognized by the Framers of 
the Constitution, and this eminence is vigorously protected by the First Amendment. 
Through this lens of Originalism and the Social Responsibility Model, 30 Supreme 
Court cases were read in search of their application. From those, 18 were chosen for 
further analysis with a 4-pronged metric informed by the sources The Language of the 
Law by John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Justice Scalia’s Originalism in 
Practice by Michael Ramsey, and Is Originalism Our Law by William Baude. This metric 
yielded the 11 cases representing a strong display of the Originalist theory presented in 
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Literature Review 
Originalism Defined  
Originalism as a theory cannot be defined by one, all-encompassing 
characterization; there are many different iterations of this ascendant theory. The late 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a strident defender of the theory, serves as a key 
primary source for broadly defining Originalism. In his speeches “Judicial Adherence to 
the Text of our Basic Law: A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation” and 
“Constitutional Interpretation The Old Fashioned Way,” Scalia asserts that Originalists 
should focus only on the direct language from the Constitution, and that language only. 
He makes it clear that an Originalist judge should not concern themselves with the 
supposed intent of the framers or with legislative history. The purpose of this strict focus 
solely on the document is a preventative measure; the theory of Originalism arguably 
prevents judges from making decisions based on how they feel, “the text and its original 
meaning are the only objective standards to which all judges can be held.” (Scalia 2012.) 
This point is furthered by his allusion to reading literature, “when we read Shakespeare, 
we use a glossary because we want to know what it meant when it was written. We don’t 
give those words their current meaning. So also with a statute – our statutes don’t 
morph, they don’t change meaning from age to age to comport with whatever the 
zeitgeist thinks appropriate.” (Scalia 2012.)  
This is in contrast with those that believe that the Constitution is a ‘living’ 
document. Scalia warns against this notion of a living and evolving document, and 
instead asserts that the Constitution should be viewed as an ‘enduring’ document. The 
purpose of the court is to uphold the laws of our land, not to reflect the evolving 
standards of society. Scalia, perhaps flippantly, put this into perspective, “Why would 
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you think these nine unelected lawyers living in a marble palace have their thumb on the 
pulse of the American people so that they know what the evolving standards of decency 
are? I don’t know what they are. I’m afraid to ask,” (Scalia 2012.)  
Scalia’s main support of Originalism, that it functions as a constraint on judges, is 
highly contested like the theory itself. Other scholars emphasize this as a weak point of 
the theory and think it should be viewed from a different vantage point. In Originalism 
as a Constraint on Judges, William Baude argues that the draw to Originalism should 
not be because of its ability to curtail, but rather its ability to serve as “an ultimate truth 
maker.” Baude argues that the idea of constraint is too ambiguous, and that it only 
works for those that “seek to be bound,” (Baude, 2017.) Scalia himself admits that 
Originalism is not a perfect method. He states, “If the law is to make any attempt at 
consistency and predictability, surely there must be general agreement not only that the 
judges reject one exegetical approach (originalism), but that they adopt another. And it 
is hard to discern any emerging consensus among the nonoriginalists as to what this 
might be.” (Baude, 2017.) Though there is some disagreement on certain aspects of the 
theory, the heart of Originalism that remains consistent is a desire to harness the truth 
behind the words of the Constitution and apply them appropriately.   
Given that Originalism relies so heavily on the text, one must understand the 
language as practiced by those that wrote the Constitution. John O. McGinnis and 
Michael B Rappaport, two leading scholars on the theory of Originalism, enumerate the 
‘language of the law’ in the source The Constitution and the Language of the Law, and 
highlight how it is significantly different from everyday language. McGinnis and 
Rappaport argue that the interpretation of English documents under the ‘language of 
the law’ produces a different meaning than when using standard English. Originalism 
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hinges on an accurate read of the Constitution, so clear comprehension of the 
implemented language is crucial. This argument for the existence of the language of the 
law is a direct support for the validity of Originalism. McGinnis and Rappaport state, 
“the meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time of its enactment. And that 
meaning was fixed by the Constitution’s language. Thus, the language in which the 
Constitution was written can make a fundamental difference to its interpretation.” 
(McGinnis and Rappaport 1325.) They argue that viewing the Constitution from the lens 
of ‘ordinary’ English is the root of interpretation disputes. However, when viewed under 
the language of the law, the document is technical, definitive, and unchanging. 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s working knowledge of the language of the law validates the 
use of Originalism as Scalia broadly defines it and has informed the metric applied to 
the Supreme Court cases.  
To reconcile the flaws presented by Scalia’s Originalism, as pointed out by Baude, 
and coupled with the framework of the language of the law, the branch of Originalism 
highlighted in this research project is “Inclusive Originalism.” The source Is Originalism 
Our Law, also by William Baude, presents Originalism as a more wide-reaching theory 
that can be reconciled with other interpretive methods. Baude contends that the current 
legal practice of the highest court can indeed be constituted as Originalism, despite 
other theorists’ notions that the Supreme Court does not abide by Originalist doctrine. 
The practice of Inclusive Originalism presented in this study “allows for precedent and 
evolving interpretations only to the extent that the original meaning itself permits 
them.” (Baude, 2015.) The Framers of the Constitution intentionally implemented a 
degree of flexibility into the document, allowing judges to utilize other devices to 
reconcile the intentional vagueness. In this way, an originalist interpretation of the 
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Constitution incorporates the use of precedent. This allowance presents a paradox. In 
Scalia’s understanding of the theory, the interpretive methods should exclusively utilize 
the direct words of the document, but Inclusive Originalism maintains that the structure 
of the document permits the use of precedent and other methods in cases of ambiguity. 
Baude reconciles the paradox by explaining, “the regular use of precedent by the 
Supreme Court in constitutional cases does not pose a threat to constitutional 
textualism or originalism, because precedent’s pedigree is itself consistent with 
originalism.” (Baude 2375.) While Inclusive Originalism is more flexible than Scalia’s, 
there is still a hierarchy to the theory, requiring “all other modalities to trace their 
pedigree to the original meaning.” (Baude 2363.) This provides a broader scope for 
originalism to thrive in the court, while still adhering to the original meaning of the 
Constitution as written by the Framers.  
Using Inclusive Originalism to inform the metric for this research allowed for a 
broader application of the Originalist theory to media law cases. By using the language 
of the law to extract the meaning, Inclusive Originalism is seen in a number of cases.  
Media at the Supreme Court 
The media’s preeminent power over American society drives many academic 
inquiries, but the source of this power receives less attention. Elizabeth Blank Hindman, 
in her work Rights and Responsibilities: The Supreme Court and the Media, provides a 
novel look at “the intersection of legal and ethical theories in their efforts to understand 
media responsibility,” (Hindman 13.) To examine this intersection, Hindman initially 
defines the core functions of the media by citing Defining Press Responsibility: A 
Functional Approach by Louis W. Hodges. According to Hodges, the media is 
categorized into four different factions: political, educational, mirroring, and bulletin 
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board. These categories are the core of the legal discourse of media responsibility, and 
span across print and digital media, specifically with regards to the press. The political 
role encompasses the ‘watchdog’ function of the press, ensuring that the people 
remained informed on a daily basis. According to Hindman, this is the main reason for 
Constitutional protection of the media. The educational function is crucial for the 
practices of modern social media, as it represents the marketplace of ideas. The courts 
strive to preserve a free and open media space where the First Amendment can thrive. 
The mirroring and bulletin board functions are also important in the digital media 
world, where human interest stories and basic information alike are available for 
citizens to learn practical details and create a sense of community. (Hindman 16.) 
From a Communication theory lens, these four functions of the media are 
underpinned by the Social Responsibility Model. This very American model emphasizes 
that media freedom is rooted in obligation to the people they serve, and that the public 
will dictate and regulate the media. (Hindman 28.) In an idealized sense of the freedom 
of press, the media would be self-regulating, but history has shown the shortcomings of 
this notion. In The Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social 
Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do by 
Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, The Social Responsibility 
Model maintains that “Freedom carries concomitant obligations; and the press, which 
enjoys a privileged position under our government, is obliged to be responsible to 
society for carrying out certain essential functions of mass communication in 
contemporary society. […] To the extent that the press does not assume its 
responsibilities, some other agency must see that the essential functions of mass 
communications are carried out.” (Peterson 74.)  So in order to maintain their freedom, 
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the media and the press must remain truthful and honest to the four functions, 
otherwise the government would intervene.  
         This notion of freedom of the press under the Social Responsibility Model is 
constitutionally backed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment, the touchstone 
of media law, maintains that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.” (US Constitution.) According to Originalist 
Reflections of Constitutional Freedom of Speech by Christopher Wolfe, the Originalist 
interpretation of the First Amendment is a strong example of Inclusive Originalism, in 
that “the force of precedent is so strong that originalists have to accept the authority of 
decisions expanding free speech significantly – extending beyond ‘no prior restraint’ to 
encompass most subsequent punishment as well.” (Wolfe 540.) The use of precedent is 
crucial because if we were to take the Amendment verbatim, as Justice Hugo Black did, 
to mean that ‘no law abridging’ that would mean that right to speak is absolute. This 
would allow for libel and seditious speech, as well as obscene speech. (Wolfe, 538.) 
Wolfe’s understanding of Originalism as applied to the First Amendment supports the 
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Methods/Metric 
In order to identify Originalist theory in a Supreme Court decision, a metric must be 
developed. The Language of the Law serves as a foundation for this metric, and Justice 
Scalia’s Originalism in Practice by Michael Ramsey laid the major framework for an 
identifying guide. The core value of Inclusive Originalism, that the use of precedent is 
acceptable so long as it is reconciled with the original meaning, is woven into the metric. 
1. Direct Quotation. Justices often reference the direct language of the Constitution. 
This is the heart of Originalism.  
2. Adopting constitutional structure and background assumptions into the 
originalist methodology. In other words, if there is verbiage not directly in the 
text, but would be necessary to preserve the design of the Constitution. There is 
an extratextual right to protect a textual right when the text is ambiguous or has 
no direct bearing on the present case. This is consistent with the hierarchical 
concept within Inclusive Originalism; allowing for precedent so long as the it can 
“trace its pedigree to the original meaning” (Baude 2363.)  
3. Post ratification history. The influence of the First Congress and First Executive 
Administration can also illuminate ambiguous text. Though there remains a 
distinction between the original meaning and the original expected application, 
the public understanding can be important for originalist constitutional 
interpretation. For example, “Where the meaning of a constitutional text (such as 
the freedom of speech) is unclear, the widespread and long-accepted practices of 
the American people are the best indication of what fundamental beliefs it was 
intended to enshrine,” (Ramsey 1962.) This also includes the Inclusive Originalist 
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acceptance of the use of precedent in order to reconcile the intentional vagueness 
of the Constitution.  
4. Adaptation to changing technology. Scalia “indicated a willingness to go beyond 
the Constitution’s text in adapting it to changed technology.” (Ramsey 1962.) 
New technology can be classified into categories that the Constitution establishes, 
not just the technology that was around at the time it was written. 
This metric aligns with Inclusive Originalism and allows for a broader application 
in order to study the relationship between Originalism and Supreme Court cases 
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Case Analysis 
Hindman’s Rights vs Responsibilities provides a comprehensive list of all 
Supreme Court cases involving the press and media from 1931-1996. A reading of her 
analysis provided some insight into which cases might contain Originalist ideology. 
After reading her book, 18 cases were chosen to be read with the above metric in mind. 
To account for the years after 1996, I referenced the syllabi of University of Michigan 
Communications and Media courses 421 and 425: Media and Policy Law and Internet, 
Society, and the Law, respectively. Cases after the 2019 court term were not taken into 
account.  
Near v Minnesota, 1931 
Case Background: 
The Saturday Press, a Minneapolis newspaper, accused the Chief of Police, the 
County Attorney, Mayor, and a member of the jury of colluding with a “Jewish gangster 
[who] was in control of gambling, bootlegging and racketeering in Minneapolis.” The 
newspaper alleged that the “law enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically 
performing their duties,” (Chief Justice Hughes.) 
This ungrounded accusation violated Section one of the Sessions Laws of 
Minnesota Act, which states that anyone, as an individual or as a member of an 
organization, who produced, published, circulated, possessed, sold or gave away 
material that was “a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or 
other periodical [was] guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may 
be enjoined.”   
The defendant Jay Near, as the owner of The Saturday Press, appealed the 
Minnesota law on the grounds that this ‘gag law’ violated his right to due process under 
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the Fourteenth Amendment; furthermore, infringing on the free press clause of the First 
Amendment.  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
Even though the Originalist theory really only became popularized in the late 
1960’s, the reasoning structure is evident in this 1931 opinion. Chief Justice Hughes 
wrote for the majority and ruled that the Minnesota statute unconstitutionally violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning that Near, the owner of The Saturday Press, could 
continue with his publication, even if it may be malicious, scandalous or defamatory. 
Hughes affirmed that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment safeguarded 
the liberty of the press and prevented the government from placing prior restraint on 
publications. Applying the metric to Hughes’ decision reveals that Hughes makes two 
references to the post ratification history and the Framers, references changing 
technology once, and makes one structural argument.  
The original meaning of the First Amendment is supported by a quote from 
Madison, stating “the great and essential rights of the people are secured against 
legislative as well as against executive ambition. They are secured, not by laws 
paramount to prerogative, but by constitutions paramount to laws. This security of the 
freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt not only from previous restraint 
by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also.” (Supreme Court 
of the US 1931.) By referencing Madison’s own understanding of the First Amendment 
and the meaning of the freedom of the press, Hughes displayed an Originalist 
interpretive technique. This reasoning fits under Inclusive Originalism, which supports 
utilizing a reasonable person’s understanding of the text at the time of adoption, and 
more importantly the writing of a member of the First Congress. 
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The post ratification history and early precedent is also present in Hughes’ 
opinion, he states, “The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light the 
general conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the 
Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from 
previous restraints or censorship. The conception of the liberty of the press in this 
country had broadened with the exigencies of the colonial period and with the efforts to 
secure freedom from oppressive administration,” (Supreme Court of the US 1931.) 
Hughes is noting that it is a historical precedent in our country to refrain from limiting 
the press. This is consistent with the Social Responsibility Model in that it is allowing 
the press to regulate itself and allow it to protect the people from government overreach.  
Near v Minnesota employs a recognition of changing technology that is also 
consistent with the Social Responsibility Model. Hughes emphasizes that even as 
technology and society advances, the necessity of a free press has not lessened, 
“Meanwhile, the administration of government has become more complex, the 
opportunities for malfeasances and corruption have multiplied [...] emphasizes the 
primary need of a vigilant and courageous press,” (Supreme Court of the US 1931.) As 
media technologies evolve, the press is the most effective tool for protecting the people 
from potentially being taken advantage of by the government.  
This case is the first major instance of press responsibility at the Supreme Court, 
and it established that the abuse of press power deserves punishment, but the abuse 
does not present enough threat to warrant prior restraint. It directly informs the 
infamous 1971 case, New York Times Co. v United States, known for the New York 
Time’s publication of the ‘Pentagon Papers,’ in addition to Smith v California.  
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Bridges v California, 1941 
Case Background: 
This is another prior restraint case, in which longshoreman’s union leader Harry 
Bridges implied in a telegram to the Secretary of Labor that his union would go on strike 
if his pending case in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County did not go in his favor. 
This telegram was distributed to multiple newspapers, including The Los Angeles Times. 
Bridges and the Times were fined and found in contempt of court, which they both 
separately appealed all the way up to the Supreme Court. (Oyez.)  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
The Supreme Court majority held the charges and fines were unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment. A clear display of early Originalist theory, Justice Hugo 
Black notes the direct language of the First Amendment two times, makes two 
references to historical precedent and the Framers, and one structural argument to 
support his majority opinion.  
Black clearly emphasizes that Constitutional language marking the freedom of 
speech leaves no room for interpretation.  “For the First Amendment does not speak 
equivocally. It prohibits any law ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ It 
must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the 
context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.” (Supreme Court of the US 1941.)  Here, 
Black draws a hard line on the ability of the government to place restraint on the press. 
In the instance of ‘clear and present danger,’ which the Superior Court of California 
suggested the telegram represented, Black utilizes the precedent standard of Schenck v 
United States. In accordance with Originalist interpretation, Black recognizes that this 
use of precedent does not devalue the language of the Constitution, “Those cases do not 
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purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor 
do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compilation of the Bill of 
Rights.” (Supreme Court of the US 1941.) This is consistent with the notion of Inclusive 
Originalism, as “it allows for precedent and evolving interpretations only to the extent 
that the original meaning itself permits them.” (Baude, 2015.) Black uses Schneck only 
to help define “clear and present danger” as it relates to this case. Despite recognizing 
that the circumstance of “the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree 
of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished,” (Supreme Court of the 
US 1941.) the court did not observe this case to meet that standard of severity. 
Furthermore, Black notes his reluctance to even use the precedent in this case because 
of his structural argument, “No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the 
freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the 
timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression.” (Supreme Court of the US 
1941.) Black’s decision emphasizes that neither Congress nor the Court should overstep 
the bounds of the Constitution.  
In Bridges v California, Originalist theory protected the press’s right to publish 
without the pressure of prior restraint. By focusing on the direct language of the First 
Amendment, Black upheld the core value of Social Responsibility of the press; that the 
press should self-regulate, and that the public will punish accordingly if the press acts 
irresponsibly. The prospect of potentially harmful publications does not present a 
sufficient enough danger to “warrant the curtailment of liberty of expression.” (Supreme 
Court of the US, 1941.) As a result of this decision, the 18th century belief that the press 
should have the liberty to act as a watchdog for the American people was maintained.  
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Smith v California, 1959  
Case Background: 
A California statute declared the possession of ‘obscene’ material by a bookstore 
proprietor, even if they had no knowledge of the content of the book, to be a criminal 
offense. Eleazar Smith was convicted of criminal charges under this statute, and he 
appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis that this statute violated the freedom of the 
press.  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
The Court ruled that the California “ordinance imposes an unconstitutional 
limitation of the public’s access to constitutionally protected matter.” (Supreme Court of 
the US 1959.) Across Justice Brennan’s majority opinion and Justice Black’s concurring 
opinion, there are three references to historical precedent, two mentions of the direct 
language of the First Amendment, and two structural notions. Justice Brennan’s 
majority opinion was informed by precedent set in Near v. Minnesota, in addition to a 
rationale that would be necessary to preserve the structure of the Constitution. Justice 
Black’s concurring opinion is indicative of the Originalist theory.  
Brennan states, “There is no specific constitutional inhibition against making the 
distributors of goods the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the constitutional 
guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing a  
similar requirement on the bookseller,” (Supreme Court of the US, 1959.) Brennan is 
maintaining that despite the Constitution not directly mention this matter, it still cannot 
support the law because it is not consistent with the structure of the first Amendment, 
so it must be unconstitutional.  
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Justice Black agrees that the statute is unconstitutional, but not for the reasons 
given by Justice Brennan. Black again cites the direct language of the Constitution, 
“Certainly the First Amendment’s language leaves no room for inference that 
abridgements of speech and press can be made just because they are slight. That 
Amendment provides, in simple words, that ‘Congress shall make no law...abridging the 
freedom of speech, or the press.’ I read ‘ no law … abridging’ to mean no law abridging. 
The First Amendment, which is the supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own value 
on the freedom of speech and press by putting these freedoms wholly ‘beyond the reach’ 
of federal power to abridge,” (Supreme Court of the US 1959.) Here, Justice Black 
examines the exact wording of the First Amendment and takes it literally. Justice Black’s 
originalist interpretation of the First Amendment does not allow for any law to abridge 
an American’s right to speech. Black’s rationale aligns with Scalia’s Originalist belief 
that any encroachment on the First Amendment presents a threat to all speech, 
“Censorship is the deadly enemy of freedom and progress. The plain language of the 
Constitution forbids it,” (Supreme Court of the US 1959.) Black’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment would forbid any demarcation of ‘obscene’ media at all; however the 
Court’s majority does not maintain this belief. This is consistent with the Social 
Responsibility Model, in that the values of freedom and progress are safeguarded by an 
unregulated press. The First Amendment assures that the press holds the power to 
protect the people. 
In addition to citing the direct wording of the First Amendment, Black again 
relies on the words of Framers James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. Madison 
affirmed that “without tracing farther the evidence on this subject, it would seem 
scarcely possible to doubt that no power whatever over the press was supposed to be 
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delegated by the Constitution, as it originally stood, and that the amendment was 
intended as a positive and absolute reservation of it,” (Supreme Court of the US 1959.) 
Black’s use of this quote proves that those that wrote the Constitution expressly rejected 
any type of media regulation. He further bolsters this evidence with quotes from 
Jefferson, “[The First Amendment] thereby guard[s] in the same sentence, and under 
the same words, the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press insomuch that 
whatever violates either throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that 
libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld 
from the cognizance of federal tribunals.”(Supreme Court of the US 1959.) The Framers 
wrote the First Amendment as wide-reaching as possible to allow for all speech, and 
they feared that an encroachment on one type of speech puts all others at risk. Black 
does concede that Madison and Jefferson were referring to federal statutes, and that 
Smith v California involves a state law. However, he claims that “our prior cases holding 
that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the First, with all the force it brings to bear 
against the Federal Government, against the States.” (Supreme Court of the US 1959.)  
This concurring opinion is significant because it reminds that although other, 
logical reasons exist as to why a statute that makes possession of obscene material 
without mens rea a criminal offense is unconstitutional -  such as Justice Brennan’s 
belief that the statute would threaten book shop owners to the degree that reading 
material would be severely limited - the underpinning factor of all opinions is the clear, 
unequivocal language of the First Amendment. All reasons are rooted in the belief that 
Americans should have unbridled access to whatever knowledge they wish to 
disseminate or consume.  
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Mills v Alabama, 1966 
Case Background:  
An Alabama statute made it illegal for a newspaper to publish an editorial 
soliciting votes on election day. James E. Mills, the editor of the Birmingham Post- 
Herald, was arrested for writing and publishing an editorial that urged people to vote for 
a new system of city government.  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
Justice Black delivered the unanimous opinion that the Alabama statute was an 
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment. In this succinct opinion, Black 
references the language of the First Amendment once, and quotes the Framers once.  
Black’s opinion focuses on the fact that this Alabama statute is a blatant 
suppression of the press. He states, “The Constitution specifically selected the press, 
which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and 
circulars, to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus, the press 
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by 
government officials, and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elated 
by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. 
Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to 
clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles 
one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtful and deliberately 
selected to improve our society and keep it free.”(Supreme Court of the US 1966.) Again, 
the Justice’s pay homage to the original design and desires of the Framers and respect 
the potential dangers they foresaw. The Alabama statute is the exact type of government 
suppression the Framers were protecting Americans from.  
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This is another example of the Social Responsibility Model at work in the 
Constitutional design. The press works for the people, not the government. By 
criminalizing a political publication, the government is directly interfering with the most 
important responsibility of the media. Black’s opinion again highlights that in order for 
the press to ‘improve our society and keep it free,’ it must remain ‘unmuzzled.’   
New York Times Co. v United States, 1971 
Case Background:  
In this famous bit of American history, better known as the Pentagon Papers 
case, President Nixon used his executive power to restraint the New York Times, along 
with the Washington Post, from reporting on the leaked Department of Defense 
documents regarding secret American activity during the Vietnam War. President Nixon 
argued that the prior restraint was a matter of national security.  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
In a 6-3 decision, the Court decided that the Nixon Administration’s use of prior 
restraint was unconstitutional, meaning that the newspapers could continue with their 
publications. Justice Black’s opinion contains six references to precedent and post 
ratification history, uses the direct language of the Constitution twice, and includes one 
structural argument.  
With regards to Nixon’s prior restraint assertion, Black states, “I can imagine no 
greater perversion of history. Madison and the other Framers of the First Amendment, 
able men they were, wrote in a language they earnestly believed could never be 
misunderstood. ‘Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom...of the press…’ 
Both the history and the language of the First Amendment support the view that the 
press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, 
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injunctions, or prior restraints, (Supreme Court of the US 1971.) This is a perfect 
example of the Originalist theory at work. He not only uses the words of the Framers, 
but also quotes the direct language of the First Amendment. Black further expands on 
the post ratification history by stating, “In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers 
gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our 
democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government’s 
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to 
censure the Government...Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose 
deception in government,” (Supreme Court of the US 1971.) Black’s firm belief in press 
freedom also gets at the Social Responsibility Model, affirming that the press serves the 
people. The Framers had the people’s protection in mind when writing the First 
Amendment, not the protection of the government.  
Black also notes that the First Amendment is a foundational element that allows 
the very nature of our governmental system to thrive. He asserts, “[T]he more 
imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free 
press, and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political 
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and 
that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of 
the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government,” (Supreme Court of the 
US 1971.) To Black, this reading of the First Amendment is crucial to uphold the rest of 
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Miami Herald v Tornillo, 1974 
Case Background:  
After publishing a criticism of Florida House of Representatives candidate Pat 
Tornillo, the Miami Herald refused to publish his rebuttal. Based on Florida’s ‘right of 
reply’ statute, Tornillo filed suit against the Miami Herald.  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
The Supreme Court held that the Florida ‘right of reply’ statute was an 
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free press. In a 
unanimous decision, the court makes two structural arguments, employs precedent and 
the words of the Framers twice, and notes the application of new technology once.  
While the right of reply statute theoretically suggests the ‘noble’ thing for the 
press to do, Chief Justice Burger emphasizes that the Constitution cannot mandate 
press responsibility. Noting the structure of the Constitution, he states, “The clear 
implication has been that any such a compulsion to publish that which ‘reason tells 
them should not be published’ is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an 
undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution 
and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”(Supreme Court of the US 1974.) 
This is in direct support of the Social Responsibility Model, allowing the press to dictate 
their own responsibilities without government interference. Here, Burger solidifies that 
the press has the power to dictate their own responsibilities. Giving the press autonomy 
allows them to base their values off of the people’s desires without government 
influence. 
Justice White elaborates further in his concurring opinion, stating, “in Jefferson’s 
words, ‘[w]here the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe.’ Any other 
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accommodation - any other system that would supplant private control of the press with 
the heavy hand of government intrusion - would make the government the censor of 
what the people may read and know.” (Supreme Court of the US 1974.)  Quoting 
Jefferson gives historical weight to the Social Responsibility Model, emphasizing that a 
government censorship of the press has dangerous potential to be in direct conflict with 
the needs of the people. 
Tornillo, the appellee, argues that the changing technology of news media affords 
the press too much power and the government should intervene. The court considers 
this argument but declares “that a free press is a condition of a free society.” (Supreme 
Court of the US, 1974.) Yet again, The Supreme Court upholds the Social Responsibility 
Model of press responsibility. Unequivocally, the court refuses to allow government 
encroachment on the press’ value system.  
F.C.C. v Pacifica Foundation, 1978 
Case Background:  
During an afternoon broadcast, a radio station in New York aired Georgie Carlin’s 
stand-up comedy monologue, titled “Filthy Words,” “which listed and repeated a variety 
of colloquial uses of words you couldn’t say on the public airwaves.” A father driving 
with his young son heard the broadcast and filed a complaint to the Federal 
Communications Commission. The FCC issued a declaratory order, which “forbids the 
use of any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication.” 
(District of Columbia Circuit Court 1978.)  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
In a close 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the FCC’s regulation was not a 
violation of the First Amendment. To show that the government had some ability to 
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regulate ‘patently offensive’ speech, Steven’s majority opinion contained one structural 
argument, two references to precedent and the Framers, and one application of 
changing technology.  
 In this case, the Court’s attitude towards a free press begins to change. Stevens 
claims that because of its pervasive nature, broadcasting is afforded the least amount of 
First Amendment protection of all forms of communication. He states, “Among the 
reasons for specially treating indecent broadcasting is the uniquely pervasive presence 
that media of expression occupies in the lives of our people. Broadcasts extend into the 
privacy of the home and it is impossible completely to avoid those that are patently 
offensive. Broadcasting, moreover, is uniquely accessible to children.” (Supreme Court 
of the US 1978.)  Stevens notes the power of changing communication technology and 
views the increasingly invasive potential as reason for allowing regulation.  
This is backed up by a precedential claim, “The First Amendment does not 
prohibit all governmental regulations that depends on the content of speech. The 
content of respondent’s broadcast, which was ‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking,’ is not 
entitled to absolute constitutional protection in all contexts;” (Supreme Court of the US 
1978.) This precedent comes from a previous case Roth v. United States, which is not 
included in the analysis because of its lack of Originalist theory application. Roth 
maintains that “Obscene materials have been denied the protection of the First 
Amendment because their contents is so offensive to contemporary moral standards.” 
(Supreme Court of the US, 1978.) This application of precedent is consistent with the 
theory of Inclusive Originalism, even though its regulation seems in contrast with 
previous Originalist decisions.  
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While the Court is still employing some Originalist interpretational skills, this 
decision is in contrast with previous Originalist decisions that did not allow for 
regulation of the press. Here, the precedent is being applied in a different manner, and 
permitting government intervention on the values of the press. This does not comport 
with the Social Responsibility Model. Instead of allowing the broadcast stations to 
decide for themselves what is appropriate for the pubic, the government is allowed to 
intervene.  
Confusingly, Justice Stevens does acknowledge that the government should 
remain neutral when it comes to speech. He states, “but the fact that society may find 
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s 
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional 
protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must 
remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas. If there were any reason to believe that the 
Commission’s characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could be traced to 
its political content – or even to the fact that it satirized contemporary attitudes about 
four-letter words – First Amendment protection might be required.” (Supreme Court of 
the US, 1978.) Despite this affirmation of the breadth of the First Amendment which is 
consistent with Inclusive Originalism, Steven’s places a higher value on the precedent 
set by Roth v United States and allows the FCC to regulate broadcasted speech. This is 
inconsistent with Inclusive Originalism, because it does not ‘trace their pedigree to the 
original meaning.’ (Baude, 2015.) 
 Since the decision for this case was extremely close, Justice Brennan’s dissent 
was also included in the analysis. The opinion included reactionary arguments to the 
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majority opinion, including one structural argument, one changing technology example, 
and one reference to the language of the Constitution.   
 In response to Stevens’ logic that the nature of broadcast radio allows it to 
permeate into the private home, Brennan suggests that those who are offended by the 
broadcast may simply turn the device off. He states, “Whatever the minimal discomfort 
suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive during 
the brief interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch stations or flick the 
“off” button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve the broadcaster’s right to send, and 
the right of those interested to receive, a message entitled to the full First Amendment 
protection,” (Supreme Court of the US 1978.) To Justice Brennan, changing technology 
is not substantial enough to encroach on the First Amendment. He allegorizes Steven’s 
logic as “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig;” (Supreme Court of the US 1978,) 
emphasizing his belief that the majority is mistaken in their decision and are over-
extending their Constitutional bounds.  
 Brennan also takes time to emphasize American cultural diversity and its 
Constitutional protection. He laments, “Yet there runs throughout the opinions of my 
Brothers Powell and Stevens another vein I find equally disturbing: a depressing 
inability to appreciate that in our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, 
act, and talk differently from the Members of this Court, and who do not share their 
fragile sensibilities. It is only an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to 
approve the censorship of communications solely because of the words they contain,” 
(Supreme Court of the US 1978.) Here, Brennan’s logic is based on the structural 
foundation of our nation: that all men shall be created equal. Brennan is disturbed by 
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the content based discrimination of the Court, as it does not reflect the many cultural 
values that make up our nation.  
 Brennan emphasizes this further by stating, “I would place the responsibility and 
the right to weed worthless and offensive communications from the public airways 
where it belongs and where, until today, it resided: in a public free to choose those 
communications worthy of its attention from a marketplace unsullied by the censor’s 
hand,”( Supreme Court of the US 1978.) This is reminiscent of Scalia’s logic, that the 
nine members of the Court should not be the ultimate counselors of what is appropriate 
for our society. Moreover, this is clearly indicative of the Social Responsibility Model; to 
allow the public to decide what the media should provide. Brennan is disappointed with 
the Court for forcing their values on the press, and therefore, onto the people.  
Hustler v Fallwell, 1988  
Case Background: 
Jerry Falwell, a public figure known as a televangelist and conservative activist 
was featured in a nationally circulated parody advertisement in Hustler Magazine. The 
‘advertisement’ satirizes the double entendre of popular Campari Liqueur ads, in which 
celebrities discuss their ‘first time’ trying the liquor; and intimates that Falwell’s “first 
time was a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse,” (The 
Fourth Circuit Court.) Falwell sued Hustler for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Hustler appealed on the basis of First Amendment press 
rights.  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
The court unanimously decided that the First Amendment protects parodies, and 
in order for public figures to win damages for emotional distress claims, they must show 
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that the speech was made with “actual malice.” In the majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist used a structural argument and a reference to the First Congress and the 
Framers.  
Justice Rehnquist utilizes Justice Steven’s confusing logic in FCC v Pacifica in 
order to support a more Originalist understanding of the Constitution. He quote’s 
Steven’s and states, “[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient 
reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that 
consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central 
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the 
marketplace of ideas.” (Supreme Court of the US 1988.) This time, this logic is being 
used to protect the press from government encroachment and upholds the Social 
Responsibility Model. Rehnquist notes that these represent “oft-repeated First 
Amendment principles,” (Supreme Court of the US 1988) emphasizing they are 
foundational and are not easily challenged. The fact that Falwell was offended by the 
parody was not enough to warrant a First Amendment violation.  
The Court also justifies the constitutionality of public figure parody by 
referencing historic parody of members of the First Congress and other notable 
American History figures. He states, “Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the 
early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic 
depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political 
debate...Lincoln’s tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt’s glasses and teeth, and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s jutting jaw and cigarette holder have been memorialized by 
political cartoons with an effect that could not have been obtained by the photographer 
or the portrait artist.” (Supreme Court of the US 1988.) This shows that parody has been 
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a historic fixture of American communication and media since the time of the Framers 
and is an important facet of political speech. Barring this kind of speech would be 
suppressing political speech, which the court has time and time again prohibited.  
Reno v ACLU,1997 
Case Background:  
In the first Supreme Court case regarding the Internet, the Attorney General of 
the United States, Janet Reno, defended two provisions of the Communications Decency 
Act, which “criminalized the ‘knowing’ transmission of ‘obscene or indecent’ messages 
to any recipient under 18 years of age...that in context, depicts or describes, in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or 
excretory activities or organs,” (Reno 1997.) The ACLU argues the statute is overbroad, 
thus violating the First Amendment. 
Case Decision & Analysis: 
In another unanimous decision, the Court held “The CDA’s ‘indecent 
transmission’ and ‘patently offensive display’ provisions abridge ‘the freedom of speech’ 
protected by the First Amendment.” (Supreme Court of the US 1997.)  
While this decision, like FCC v Pacifica, does not represent an entirely Originalist 
opinion, this landmark case is monumentally important for the way our society engages 
with online media, so it was included in the analysis.  
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens argues the statute is far too overbroad, 
that it prevents parents from consenting to their child’s use of restricted material, and 
that the statue fails to define ‘indecent.’ In addition, Stevens makes two references to the 
fact that the Internet is a boundlessly capable new technology, and one structural 
argument.  
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Stevens argues that the Internet is unlike other forms of communication that 
have been subject to regulations in the past because it does not have limited frequencies, 
it is noninvasive, and that it would be unlikely for one to accidentally stumble upon 
explicit content. He states, “[S]ome of our cases have recognized special justifications 
for regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers...the 
scarcity of available frequencies at its inception, and its ‘invasive’ nature...those factors 
are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA have 
the vast democratic forums of the Internet been subject to the type of government 
supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry. Moreover, the 
Internet is not as ‘invasive as radio or television. The District Court specifically found 
that ‘[c]ommunications over the Internet do not ‘invade’ an individual's home or appear 
on one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content ‘by accident.’ It 
also found that ‘[a]lmost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the 
content ,’ and cited testimony that ‘odds are sim’ that a user would come across aa 
sexually explicit sight by accident.” (Supreme Court of the US 1997.) Stevens assessed 
the previously set standards of media regulation and found that it did not match, so the 
Internet must remain beyond the Government’s reach.  
The opinion is closed out with the statement, “As a matter of constitutional 
tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental 
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of 
ideas than to encourage it, The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a 
democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.” 
(Stevens, 1997.) Though Stevens employed other interpretive theories for this opinion, 
Constitutional tradition and structure consistent with Originalism underpins the 
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argument and upholds the Social Responsibility Model. Stevens is affirming that the 
value of free expression is greater than the perceived value of government censorship. 
Like never before, the Internet offers the entire public a brand-new opportunity to 
publish their own material and exercise their speech. Now, the Social Responsibility 
Model includes the public in a new way, and extends the ability for all people to 
determine their own publishing values without government censorship.  
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 2011 
Case Background:  
A California statute “prohibit[ing] the sale or rental of violent video games to 
minors and requir[ing] their packaging be labeled ‘18,’” was challenged by 
representatives of the video game industry as a violation of the First Amendment.  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the statute was indeed an unconstitutional 
violation of the First Amendment. Justice Scalia’s brief majority opinion includes two 
applications of the original meaning to changing technology, and one reference to the 
direct language of the First Amendment.  
In Scalia’s view, the qualities of a video game are not so drastically different from 
classical media to constitute government restrictions. He states, “Like the protected 
books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas - and 
even social messages- through many familiar literary devices...and through features 
distinctive to the medium...That suffices to confer First Amendment protection. Under 
our Constitution, ‘esthetic and moral judgement about art and literature...are for the 
individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or 
approval of a majority. And whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to 
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ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like 
the First Amendment command, do not vary’ when a new and different medium for 
communication appears.” (Supreme Court of the US 2011.)  This consistently applied 
notion of allowing the public to decide for themselves what they deem appropriate for 
consumption is in line with Originalism and the Social Responsibility Theory. Scalia 
upholds the invariable meaning of the First Amendment by refraining from making a 
content or technologically based discrimination.  
Packingham v North Carolina 2017 
Case Background:  
A North Carolina criminal statute prohibits registered sex offenders from using 
social media sites that also allow minors to make accounts. In 2010, Lester Packingham, 
a registered sex offender, was arrested for violating the statute after making a Facebook 
post. He appealed and argued that the statute violated his First Amendment rights.  
Case Decision & Analysis: 
The Court unanimously decided that the North Carolina law unconstitutionally 
violated the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy’s brief opinion is a reflection of Reno v 
ACLU, in that the Court recognizes the immense communicative power of the 
Internet.  Kennedy’s opinion represents an application of new technology within the 
parameters of the First Amendment.  
He states, “A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons 
have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak 
and listen once more...While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the 
most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is 
clear. It is cyberspace-the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general and social 
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media in particular.” (Supreme Court of the US 2017.) While the government of course 
has substantial interest in protecting children from harm, the statute too broadly sweeps 
over valuable access to speech. Yet again, the Court upholds the Social Responsibility 
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Conclusion 
After analyzing these 11 media law cases through the applied metric of Inclusive 
Originalism, it is clear that the Originalist theory has been applied to preserve the First 
Amendment rights of the press and media. In the cases presented in this analysis there 
were 19 references to precedent and the Framers, 10 structurally based arguments, 8 
direct references to the original language of the First Amendment, and 8 
acknowledgements of changing technology. This shows that the Originalist theory is 
most often applied through the use of precedent and by placing the present case in the 
context of the Framers.  
The selection of applicable cases reveals that Originalism is typically used in cases 
that involve government abuse of prior restraint and over-broad regulations of obscenity 
or indecency. The Court employs Originalism to emphasize to Congress or the States 
that they are over-stepping their constitutional bounds. When Originalism is applied, 
the Social Responsibility Model is widely upheld, and press freedom is maintained.  
The Originalist theory was not as prevalent in media law cases as originally 
predicted. Some Justices, mainly Justice Black, certainly utilize the theory more than 
others. Nevertheless, its application in landmark Supreme Court cases has undoubtedly 
shaped our nation’s legal relationship with the media. First Amendment protections of 
speech and press allow the Social Responsibility Theory to thrive. Especially with the 
Internet, the Originalist theory has aided in the preservation of press freedom and has 
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